Introduction
The Paris Declaration "appears as a first attempt to tackle international policy coordination problems in the field of development aid" (Severino and Ray 2010: 19) . In March 2005 donors agreed not only to better align foreign aid flows with priorities of the recipient country and to harmonize procedural issues of aid delivery. They also promised to render aid more effective by "eliminating duplication of efforts and rationalising donor activities to make them as cost-effective as possible" (OECD 2005: paragraph 3) . Donors "commit to make full use of their respective comparative advantage at sector or country level" (paragraph 35), acknowledging that aid fragmentation impairs effectiveness while "a pragmatic approach to the division of labour … can reduce transaction costs" (paragraph 33).
1 Yet, as stressed by Chandy (2011) , "commitments are regularly professed but rarely fulfilled" in international development cooperation. It seems that donors want to "plant their flags" almost everywhere (World Bank 1998: 26) , even though Knack and Rahman (2007) show theoretically and empirically that aid fragmentation impairs bureaucratic quality in highly aid dependent countries.
According to Easterly (2007: 639-640) , the inclination of donors "to give to all sectors in all countries" causes severe coordination problems and "huge administrative costs for both recipients and donors."
Indeed, descriptive statistics suggest that aid fragmentation and duplication persisted until recently (Aldasoro et al. 2010 ).
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More systematic analyses controlling for the heterogeneity of donors and other confounding factors are scarce. Some earlier aid allocation studies, including Berthélemy (2006) , account for possible bandwagon effects by considering aid from all other donors as a 1 In addition, the European Union passed the European Consensus on Development in November 2005, which "for the first time identified a framework of common principles for the member states and the commission in this policy field [development cooperation]" (Engel and Keijzer 2008) . 2 Note also that the Paris Declaration has been evaluated in considerable detail from the perspective of individual recipient countries. Most recently, Wood et al. (2011: 26) concluded, inter alia, that "aid fragmentation is still found to be high in at least half of the evaluations." The summary report of Wood et al. (2011) provides mainly qualitative assessments on the basis of various case studies conducted by independent evaluation teams managed by the respective partner country.
determinant of donor j's aid to recipient country i. Davies and Klasen (2011) focus on such effects within a GMM regression framework, finding that aid from all other donor countries tends to crowd in aid from donor j. Davies and Klasen (2011) suspect that it might be due to better coordination among donors that crowding-in effects weakened somewhat in the more recent past. Frot and Santiso (2011) find evidence for herding among donors when employing herding measures inspired by the financial literature. 4 The subsequent analysis contributes to filling the wide gaps that remain. In contrast to previous studies, we consider both the (recipient) country level and the sector level of the allocation of aid.
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This is important to avoid biased results; a donor may for instance be present in many recipient countries and, yet, this donor may specialize and reduce duplication by focussing on aid in one specific field such as education. Furthermore, we employ separate measures to assess changes in the degree of specialization of individual donors and in the degree of coordination among donors. This is another important contribution to the literature which typically fails to take into account that the need for coordination might decrease if donors decided unilaterally to specialize. Finally, we account for donor heterogeneity, changing aid priorities and major characteristics of the recipient countries. In this way, we isolate the effects of the Paris Declaration on aid fragmentation and donor coordination.
Method and variables
We address two related questions. First, we assess whether major bilateral and multilateral donors have specialized and focussed their aid on a smaller number of recipient countries and aid topics (aid sectors in OECD jargon) after agreeing to the Paris Declaration. Second, we evaluate whether donors coordinated more intensively by reducing the overlaps between their own activities and those of other donors. The overlaps in the second step of our analysis are also calculated along the two dimensions of recipient countries and aid sectors. We cover about 140 recipient countries and 24 aid sectors.
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While the Paris Declaration calls for donors to specialize and coordinate aid efforts, the subsequent OECD-DAC Surveys on Monitoring the Paris Declaration have failed to specify relevant indicators to judge implementation in these important areas (Knack et al. 2010). 7 We close this gap by making use of the rich aid commitment data collected in the DAC's Creditor Reporting System (CRS). As for donor-specific specialization or, conversely, aid fragmentation, we follow Acharya et al. (2006) who prefer the Theil index over the Herfindahl index:
with aid i,s representing the share of aid commitments in sector s to recipient i in donor country j's overall aid budget at time t. The index takes the minimum value ln(1) = 0 if donor j is completely specialized (all aid goes to sector s in country i); it rises with the extent of fragmentation and reaches its maximum ln(n*m) when aid is evenly distributed among countries and sectors.
To assess the degree of donor coordination, we refer to the earlier trade literature where overlaps in trade patterns have often been used to assess the empirical relevance of intra-industry trade.
9 Accordingly, the index of aid overlap (OV) or, respectively, the degree of donor coordination (C) between donors j1 and j2 at time t can be calculated as follows:
6 See Appendix C for the list of aid sectors. 7 DAC stands for the OECD's Development Assistance Committee. 8 The Herfindahl index attaches disproportionately high weights to the largest aid shares of particular recipients and sectors in a donor's overall aid budget. 9 See Aldasoro et al. (2010) for more details and the relevant literature.
with aid i,s defined as before. OV varies from 0 in the case of no overlap to 1 in the case of complete overlap. The underlying assumption is that the aid overlap should be considerably less than one, and declining over time, for donors who avoided duplication of aid activities and increasingly engaged in coordinated aid allocation.
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In contrast to Aldasoro et al. (2010) who simply portray the development of Theil and overlap indices over time (until 2006) , the subsequent analysis accounts for various determinants of specialization and coordination, notably the heterogeneity of donors and aid portfolios as well as major recipient characteristics. The estimation equations are as follows:
The first dependent variable TH is defined as in equation (1) While we control for general budget support (DAC/CRS code 510), debt relief operations (code 600) and also aid classified as "multisector/cross-cutting" (code 400), we follow Frot and Santiso (2011) in excluding emergency food aid (code 710) from the analysis. Donors routinely react to natural disasters and famines by increasing food aid; Frot and Santiso use the term "beneficial" herding if aid overlaps increase as a result. 13 Recall that time-invariant level effects of economic and political clout would be captured by the donor fixed effects δ. 14 See also Davies and Klasen (2011) who argue that increasing selectivity in terms of donors focussing on needy and deserving recipients could result in crowding-in effects of aid from other donors on aid from donor j. 15 In a robustness test, we use only the data since 2004 (see Section 3 below).
Development Agency).
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All donors in our sample belong to the participating countries and organizations of the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005).
In addition to equation (4), we estimate a modified model in which we use bilateral aid overlaps as the dependent variable -instead of the average overlap of aid from donor j with all other donors in the sample. In the bilateral model we consider fixed effects for each pair of donors. The timevarying variables are redefined by taking the average for the two donors of the respective pair.
17
As concerns membership in the UN Security Council, we introduce another dummy variable which is set equal to one when both donors of a pair were members. Finally, the bilateral model includes two variables reflecting the trade and political links between the two donors of each pair, namely the mutual importance as a trading partner of the other member of the pair and the degree of conformity in UN voting patterns. We have no strong priors, however, whether closer links of this sort would necessarily imply better coordinated aid efforts. Table 1 reports our estimation results based on equations (3) and (4) for the whole sample period 1998-2009. We start with a baseline estimation in which we control only for variables related to the size and structure of donor j's aid budget. Subsequently, we augment this specification by additionally considering the donor and recipient-country characteristics introduced above. All regressions include donor as well as year fixed effects.
Results
The baseline estimations are alternatively performed for all donors and for bilateral donors only.
Restricting the analysis to bilateral donors in columns (2) and (5) allows for a direct comparison 16 See the list in Appendix B. The two multilateral donors have to be excluded when estimating extended specifications of our model (with donor characteristics related to trade and political interests included). 17 Recipient country characteristics are no longer considered in the modified model with bilateral overlaps as they proved to be insignificant at conventional levels in the baseline estimation of equation (4) reported in Table 1 below. 18 Note that the variation of these variables is limited over time. Moreover, aid overlaps may even increase among donors with similar trade and political interests.
with the augmented specification in columns (3) and (6) 
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In line with expectations, a rising share of debt relief in the overall aid budget is associated with a lower Theil index and a larger aid overlap. At the same time, general budget support has increasingly been used by some donors while others are still reluctant to transfer resources directly to governments (e.g., European
Commission 2008). General budget support exhibits a significant relationship with the Theil index, again with the expected negative sign, while overlaps are not affected in a significant way.
Columns (3) and (6) show the results when we additionally account for donor and recipient-country characteristics. In this extended model, recipient-country characteristics relate to GDP per capita as an indicator of need and control of corruption as an indicator of merit; both variables are calculated 19 HIPC stands for heavily indebted poor countries.
as simple averages for all recipients included in a donor's country portfolio. In Table 2 , we replicate the regressions for the sub-period 2004-2009. This helps us assess whether the impact of varying aid priorities as well as donor and recipient characteristics has changed since the Paris Declaration. Furthermore, we test for the robustness of the year dummies in this way. As before, most of the coefficients on the donor and recipient characteristics are insignificant at conventional levels. The weak and scattered impact of these characteristics on the Theil and overlap 20 We also experimented with weighting these characteristics by (i) the recipient countries' population and (ii) the amount of aid granted by donor j to these countries. Both weighting schemes appear to be problematic, however, so that results are not reported. Using population weights implies that China and India dominate all other recipient countries. Using aid amounts may lead to biased results especially for the Theil indices, the calculation of which is also based on the aid amounts granted by donor j.
indices is not surprising considering that variation over time is further reduced during the shorter period of observation. In contrast to Table 1 , increasing military clout has been associated with larger overlaps since the Paris Declaration. It may also be noted that better control of corruption has affected both dependent variables since then. The larger overlap going along with better control of corruption may be attributed to various donors focussing their support on less corrupt recipients.
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All the same, aid appears to have become more fragmented -possibly because donors could choose among a larger number of less corrupt recipient countries in recent years.
The impact of variations in the structure of aid budgets is accentuated in Table 2 , compared to the results for the whole period of observation. Increasing shares devoted to general budget support and debt relief have qualitatively the same impact as in Table 1 Importantly, the coefficients of the year dummies remain the same as before even though the shorter period of observation modifies the results for some of our control variables. None of the year dummies suggests that aid has become less fragmented after adopting the Paris Declaration (columns 1-3). Almost all year dummies corroborate the earlier verdict that coordination has even weakened (columns 4-6).
In the final step of our analysis, we use bilateral overlaps instead of average overlaps as the dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 3 , for the full sample period in columns (1) consistently positive impact on overlaps. Furthermore, Table 3 underscores the previous finding that the quantitative impact of debt relief on overlaps further increased in the recent past.
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In contrast to the average overlaps considered in Table 1 , the bilateral overlaps in columns (1)-(4) of Table 3 are significantly larger for donor pairs whose (average) aid budget increased. While this pattern was to be expected, it was reversed in the more recent past according to the estimations shown in columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 . Until more recent data become available, one might suspect that this surprising result is driven by donors who scaled up aid and used the additional resources to support previous aid orphans or previously neglected sectors, thereby reducing the overlaps with aid from other donors.
The earlier findings on the donor characteristics used as proxies of economic and political clout are largely robust when employing bilateral overlaps as the dependent variable. Specifically, the evidence is again in conflict with the view that donors with increasing economic clout, in terms of GDP, and stronger trade interest in developing and emerging economies are less inclined to coordinate aid activities with other donors. By contrast, the evidence tends to support such a sceptical view for donors with increasing military expenditures, notably in the more recent past.
Likewise, Table 3 24 Note that the fully specified estimation in columns (4) and (8) of Table 3 does not cover the year 2009 due to missing data on UN voting patterns.
Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we have assessed whether major bilateral and multilateral donors have specialized and 
